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ABSTRAK
Pemetaan a filiasi politik masyarakat adalah penting untuk memahami arah dan 
karakter kekuasaan di masa mendatang. Orientasi politik massa di Indonesia secara 
general tidak jauh berbeda dengan apa yang digariskan oleh Clifford Geertz dalam 
karya master piece-nya bertajuk The Religion of Java. Konsep trikotomi yang terdiri 
atas Santri, Abangan dan Priyayi itu, selama lima dekade terakhir ini telah menjadi 
arena pembantaian tesis Geertz. Beragam titik lemah dan kekeliruan konseptual 
karya ini menjadi pintu masuk untuk kembali merekonstruksikan konsep orientasi 
politik masyarakat Indonesia. Kendati demikian, karya Geertz ini patut diapresiasi 
sebagai pendekatan awal yang brilian dalam memahami perilaku politik bangsa 
Indonesia. Dengan pendekatan kritis, napak tilas inteletual Geertz ini akan kembali 
dimanfaatkan untuk memetakan arah afiliasi politik masyarakat Indonesia 
kontemporer. 
The mapping of political affiliation is important to capture the power direction and 
its characteristics in the future. Generally, the mass political orientation in 
Indonesia is not much different than what was outlined by Clifford Geertz in his 
master piece entitled The Religion of Java. The concept of 'trikotomi' consisting of 
the Santri, Abangan, and Priyayi, which over the past five decades has been the 
fundamentally critiqued by various parties. Numerous weak points and fallacy of 
conceptual framwork then become the entrance to reconceptualize the Indonesian 
people political orientation. However, the work of Geertz's initial approach should 
be appreciated as a brilliant in understanding the Indonesian political behavior. 
With the critical approaches, the Geertz's approaches will again be utilized to map 
the direction of community in the contemporary Indonesian political orientation. 
Keywords: Democracy, Islamic Politics, Political Behaviour, and Political 
Party.    
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A. Introduction 
The Religion of Java is one of the Clifford Geertz’s 
masterpieces providing fuel for the debate among social scientists and 
strongly influencing scholars of Indonesia. For decades they could not 
escape from the great shadow of the former Professor Emeritus at the 
Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton’s persuasive theory and his 
incredibly powerful work of descriptive ethnography in which the 
discipline was facing ‘double crisis’ of representation and of 
legitimation at the time.1 Geertz is a brave anthropologist confidently 
defy the tradition of social science technical writing proven by the 
book’s literatures which were less than two dozen citations only and 
no bibliography making it no clear objectives and effort to put itself in 
relation to previous scholarship or ongoing debates in Indonesian 
society or on Islam.2
 The Religion of Java is the result of the long time fieldwork in the 
remote area of East Java namely Pare, Kediri, otherwise called 
‘Modjokuto’ that later become an indispensable framework to 
understand the modern Indonesian political culture based on the 
description of complicated social interactions reflecting the discourses 
of nationalism, bureaucratization, socio-political organization which 
were transforming Javanese society. Geertz emphasized on the schism 
pattern in the Islam and Javanism relation which was considerably 
influencing religious confrontation, social conflict, and political 
behavior of Javanese society. Since religious schism causes political 
schism later inspiring the concept of ‘political streams’.3
1  Brewer, John, Ethnography, Buckingham, Open University Press, 2000, 
p.2; Clifford, James and George Marcus, Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics 
of Enthography, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986; Clifford, 
James, The Predicament of Culture, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1988; Marcus, George and Michael Fisher, Anthropology as Cultural Critique,
Chicago, IL, (Chicago University Press, 1986), p. 45-76.   
2  White, Ben, ‘Clifford Geertz: Singular Genius of Interpretative 
Anthropology’, Development and Change, Vol. 38, Issue 6, 2007), p. 1187-1208.  
3  Effendy, Bahtiar, Islam dan Negara, Transformasi Pemikiran dan 
Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia, Jakarta, Paramadina, 1998, p.32; Geertz, Clifford, 
The Javanese Village, in G. William Skinner (ed), Local, Ethnic, and National 
Loyalities in Village Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell 
University, 1959, p. 34-41; Geertz, Clifford, The Social History of an Indonesian 
Town, Cambrigde, MIT, 1965. 
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To describe the Javanese socio-political relations, Geertz 
created a sociological formula by distinguishing three varieties of 
Javanese Islam namely Abangan (Javanist-syncretist), Santri 
(orthodox-modernist), and Priyayi (Indic, Hindu-Buddhisht), as well 
as connected each to a particular social class. As simply defined by 
Geertz that Abangan is a part of Javanese Muslim tending to be 
syncretic mix of animist, Hindu-Buddhist, and Muslim community 
predominantly lived in the remote-rural area.4 Koentjoroningrat 
(1985) and Pranowo (1991) stated that the term of Abangan seems to 
be a highly pejorative stereotype to indicate the Javanist Muslim not 
adhering strictly to the precepts of religion.5 Thus, Koentjoroningrat 
recommended replacing term of Abangan by using ‘Javenese Islam’, 
Kejawen or ‘Javanist’, and ‘Javenese Religion’. Two recommended 
terms of Javanist and Javanese Religion would be acceptable as 
original categorizations of Javanese belief, but not for ‘Javenese 
Islam’. It would be philosophically problematic in facing the major 
Islamic Puritanism mainstream believing in the kaffah or religious 
totality concept protecting Islam from syncretism and animistic ethos. 
Santri category is used to identify a more orthodox variant of 
Islam which was predominantly consisted of merchants and wealthier 
peasants who are strict adherent of Islamic teachings.6  Marshal 
Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974) critiqued Geertz’s paradigm 
in identifying Santri category by using ‘scripturalist perspective’ 
ignoring the fact of grey areas in the Javenese Muslim social 
behaviour accommodating Javenese culture and strict Islamic 
teaching. Bambang Pranowo (1991) described many PKI & PNI’s 
activists were good Muslims who could recite Al-Qur’an fluently. 
Geertz’s seems to embrace the vision of Orientalist unequally 
depicting Islam as a thin by more accommodating and accepting 
uncritically his modernist santri informants’ narrow views of what is 
really Islamic and then speculatively rejecting the Islamic practices 
4  Geertz, Clifford, The Religion of Java, Chicago and London, University 
of Chicago Press, 1960, p.6.    
5 Hefner, Robert, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East 
Java, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46. No. 3, August 1987, p. 533. 
6  Liddle, R. William and Saiful Mujani, Islamist Parties and Democracy: 
The Indonesian Case, Working paper, Ohio State University, 2007.  
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done by abangan and priyayi as un-Islamic.7 The Geertz’s point of 
view later has been accused as a part of Geertz’s contributions to the 
relative marginalization of Islam in Indonesian discourse.8 It is more 
contentiously phrased as what Azyumardi Azra (2003) mentions the 
“myth of abangan” which means that Javanese or Indonesian and 
generally Southeast Asian Islam is not really Islam.9
And the last category of the trichotomy is Priyayi which is 
used to point an elite heritage strongly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist 
principles of earlier Javanese courts associated to aristocrats 
committing to well behaved in language, arts, behavior, intuitive 
mysticism perpetuated by colonial administrative bureaucracy in the 
modern era.10 In this context, the principal weakness of the Religion 
of Java becoming a unequivocal critique is located on Geertz’s fatal 
careless in classifying Priyayi as one of religious categories rather 
than a distinction of social class in the social stratification of Javanese 
society.11 As stated by Hefner, priyayi is not appropriately credited as 
7 White, Ben, ‘Clifford Geertz: Singular Genius of Interpretative 
Anthropology’, Development and Change, Vol. 38, Issue 6, 2007, p. 1187-1208; 
Nakamura, Mitsuo, The Cresent Aries over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the 
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, Jogjakarka, Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 1983; Dhofier, Zamakhsyari, ‘Santri-Abangan dalam Kehidupan 
Orang Jawa: Teropong dari Pesantren, Prisma, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1978, p. 48-63; 
Woodward, Mark, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of 
Yogyakarta, Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1989.  
8  Hefner, Robert, ‘Islam in an Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious 
Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia’, in Robert Hefner and P. Horvatich (eds ), Islam 
in an Era of Nation-States, Honolulu, HI, University of California Press, 1999, p. 
11-16. 
9  Newland, L., “Under the Banner of Islam: Mobilizing Religious 
Identities in West Java”, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, Vol.11, No.2, 
2000, p. 199-222; Newland, L. “Syncretism and the Politics of the Tingkeban in 
West Java”, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 12, No.3, 2001, p. 312-
326.  
10 Geertz, 1960, Op.Cit, p. 5-6 
11Koentjoroningrat, R.M., ‘Review of the Religion of Java’, Majalah-
majalah Ilmu Sastra Indonesia, No. 2, 1963, p. 188-191; Kartodirdjo, Sartono, The 
Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions Course, and Sequel, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p.50; Ricklef, M.C., ‘Six Centuries of Islamization in Java’, 
in N. Levtzion (ed), Conversion to Islam, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979, p. 
100-128; Boland, B.J., The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, p.4; Bachtiar, Harsya, ‘The Religion of Java: A 
Commentary’, Madjalah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia, Vol. 5, 1973, hh. 65-115. 
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religious culture but a social class represented by aristocrats as 
opposed to ‘wong cilik’ or ordinary and proletariat people. Hence in 
the religious categorization, priyayi can be identified into both 
abangan and santri.
Those have been strengthened by Nakamura’s research  
finding many priyayi have been strict adherents of Islam including the 
family of Javanese palace either Surakarta or Jogjakarta palace.12
Another unique phenomenon countering Geertz’s sociological formula 
come from Pesantren Tegalrejo, Magelang systematically written by 
Bambang Pranowo in which the Islamic boarding school was 
established by a priyayi namely KH. Abdurrahman.13 He is a descent 
of Pangeran Diponegoro’s family well-known as Jogjakarta palace’s 
family. The pesantren was founded among kejawen and there is a 
blend of Islamic orthodoxy and mystical features where santri also 
respectfully accommodate and tolerate the abangan tradition such as 
maintaining the belief of wali as a part of the Javanese beliefe system 
(Koentjoroningrat, 1985: 319), and also performing jatilan and 
wayangan in pesantren’s akhirusanah or annual graduation cele-
bration.
The critique on the priyayi categorization is scientifically 
acceptable proven by Geertz’s confusion in transforming the religious 
schisms into the ideological-political grouping in which Geertz kindly 
tended to sacrifice and hidden priyayi and more emphasize on santri 
and abangan categories only (Effendy, 1998: 38). Apparently, Geertz 
seemed to be in difficulties for explaining priyayi as a part of religious
categories, because the strong religious-cultural distinctions can be 
clearly found in abangan and santri’s religious tradition only. William 
Liddle (1977) affirms Geertz’s confusion by elaborating Geertz’s 
previous stand in his another book entitled the Social Context of 
Economic Change: an Indonesian Case Study (1956) in which Geertz 
clearly focused on abangan and santri categorization only.  
The critique tends to be true when Geertz’s ideologically 
political grouping of the three variants resulting two political 
orientations of abangan and santri only. Thus, it is possibly 
reasonable to justify that priyayi was used by Geertz, as strict 
Weberian, just for complement to adjust Weber’s trichotomy concept 
12 Nakamura, 1983, Op.Cit. p. 49.  
13 Pranowo, 1991, Op.Cit, p. 52 
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of social classes, or possibly to distinguish his thesis from Robert 
Jay’s ‘Religion and Politics in Rural Java’ (1963) clearly emphasizing 
on the religious and political schism of abangan and santri only. 
Geertz’s apology of trichotomy was done by explaining that political 
maneuver process played by the political streams of Javanist and 
orthodox Muslim producing a political alliance between abangan and 
priyayi opposing to santri.14 His argument seems to be reasonable 
since both abangan and priyayi tend to be reluctant to the santri’s
exclusive characteristic. Ricklef (1979)15 argued that the inclination of 
self-consciously antagonistic relation between abangan and santri has 
occurred after the movement of purification Islam otherwise called 
Islamization of Java historically triggered by strains of the Madiun 
massacres and the tragic bloodshed of 1965 stimulating tension 
between Javanist consisted of Indonesian Communist Party’s 
followers and orthodox Muslims forced Javanese to determine their 
stands whether as pure Muslim or Javanist.16
Geertz’s dichotomy of santri and abangan political streams 
later has become a pivotal popular framework to understand Javanese 
society, politics, and religion, even to analyze the pattern of elite 
competition supercharged with ideological rivalry and party 
mobilization in the Indonesian political constellation. Muslims who 
self-identify as santri might be more open to Islamic party platform 
than those who identify as either abangan or priyayi. Abangan is 
tended to be credited to the base of the major non-Islamic parties 
campaigning on liberal, nationalist, and socialist and other types of 
ideological platforms of the past particularly the communist PKI and 
nationalist PNI of the 1950s. On the other hand, santri is politically 
associated to Islam parties using Islamic imagery or promoting 
Islamist ideas of the past represented by Masyumi and Nahdlatul 
Ulama of the 1950s. In this stage, it can be more clearly understood 
that Geertz actually just want to look Indonesian politics as the battle 
arena of ‘syncretism’ and ‘orthodoxy’.  
14 Geertz, 1965, Op.Cit. p.128.  
15Ricklef , 1979, Op.Cit. p.115.  
16  Jay, Robert T. Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, Cultural 
Report series, No. 12, Program in Southeast Asian Studies, (New Haven, Yale 
Univerity, 1963), p.16.  
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The political stream dichotomy is later more complicated after 
occurring the extreme political fragmentation in the santri community 
of ‘pro-Islamist’ and ‘anti-Islamist’ factions resulting two middle 
political poles of traditionalist santri represented by Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and modernist-conservative santri shown by the Consultative 
Assembly of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi). The factionalism in 
1955 election has become a critical watershed in the development of 
Indonesian political culture (Barton, 2008: 11). The political 
landscape objectively indicated that religious orientations had become 
a pivotal preference determining people’s political affiliation shown 
by the Islamic parties’ highest electoral appeal of 44 percent while the 
secular.17
The quiet similar political inclination occurred in the election 
1999 after significantly social and political turbulences of the reform 
movement. Barton (2008) argued that the voting patterns of election in 
1955 and 1999 have scarcely changed at all when it comes to 
‘syncretism’ and ‘orthodoxy’ sentiment by choosing between Islamic 
parties of 1999 represented by PBB, PBR, PK(S), PPP and non-
Islamic parties such as PDIP, Golkar Party, Demokrat Party, including 
PAN and PKB which have consciously remained open and multi-faith 
parties with nationalist ambitions.18 The non-Islamic parties mostly 
commit to Pancasila as their ideology adopting special emphasis on 
the concepts of religious belief, humanity, unity, democracy, and 
social justice without promoting Islam. But, the Barton’s argument is 
countered by Liddle and Mujani’s thesis convincing that political 
streams had ended in 1999 election proven by the massive split voting 
phenomenon in which many Muslims politically supported Megawati 
and her PDIP which is popular as the base of abangan affiliation. The 
question is whether the political streams framework popularized by 
17  Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962; Lev, Daniel, “Political Parties in Indonesia,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Special Issdue, March 1967, p. 52-67; Liddle, 
William R., Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970; Emmerson, D., Indonesia’s Elite: 
Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976; 
Crouch, Harrold, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.  
18  Barton, Greg, Forthcoming ‘Indonesia’, in Barry Rubin (ed.) Global 
Survey of Islamism, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2008). 
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Geertz still relevant for analyzing the contemporary Indonesian 
political context?  
B. The Shadow of Political Streams and Pragmatism 
One argues that political stream may be precise to analyzing 
Indonesian political development in the early national independence, 
while the recent political Islam has been transformed and diversified. 
Beside that, the recent Indonesian Muslims tends to be more 
politically rational in which their political preferences are no longer 
determined by religious stream sentiment. Political Islam’s 
characteristic also dramatically changes which is no longer equivalent 
to Islamist aspiration of pro-syari’ah and promoting agenda of Islamic 
law formalization anymore but tends to be more pragmatist. 19
It is true that the process of Santrinization emphasizing on the 
Islamic pietism dramatically improve in the contemporary Indonesia. 
Fealy (2008) noted that “Islam is penetrating far more deeply into 
people’s lives than ever before and Muslims are expressing their faith 
in a multitude of ways” such as more diligently attending to regular 
prayer, fasting during Ramadhan, joining into Islamic study groups, 
and consuming ‘Islamic products’ like syari’ah banking and Muslim 
clothing.20 The situation is much contradictory with the shrinking 
trend of Islamic parties’ electoral appeals in election 1999, 2004, and 
2009. The Muslim voters’ popular attitudes indicate that they no 
longer convince voting as “confessional” practice considerably 
correlated to their faith principal.  
Most of Muslim voters convince that Islam platforms are not 
critical for their electoral preferences, even though Islam may be 
crucial for their personal lives. Indonesian Muslims tend to endorse 
secular politics separating public service from religion, rather than 
Islamic politics, proven by the Indonesian Survey Institute (2007)’s 
survey showing 57 percent of respondents prefer to secular values in 
politics while 33 percent support Islamic platforms. Based on the 
perspective, Wanandi (2002) arguably justify Indonesian Islam is 
19Baswedan, Anies Rasyid, ‘Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and 
Future Trajectory’, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, 2004, p. 669-690. 
20  Fealy, Greg and Shally White (ed), Expressing Islam: Religious Life 
and Politics in Indonesia, Indonesia Update Series, RSPAS, Australian National 
University, 2008. 
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inherently more moderate than Islam elsewhere in the world.21 In case 
of election 2009, generally voters including Muslims endorse good 
governance growth, reduction of the unemployment and poverty rates 
as the major key to electoral sentiment rather than religious stream 
sentiment (Xinhua, February 7, 2008). 
One argues that today political Islam is characterized by 
diversity in and pragmatism over Muslim aspirations.22 In the lame 
presidential system since 1999 to 2009 caused by the absence of a 
dominant party causing the elected executive government haunted by 
the specter of bitter opposition in parliament. In that situation, both 
Islamic and non-Islamic political parties controlled by opportunist 
leaders tend to pragmatically looking for political safety and economic 
profit by joining into coalition hoping accommodated into the 
government body. Parties including the Islamic parties expected to 
conduct their both tactical and strategic roles based on pragmatic 
consideration rather than ideologies, platforms, and political values. 
Effendy (2009) sees the phenomenon as the positive effect of the 
withering away of politics of streams in which ideology, socio-
religious, and traditional values shaped the characteristic of political 
behavior. The next question is whether both the atmosphere liberal 
democracy resulting sphere of political pragmatism and the change of 
Muslims’ paradigm totally demolishes the phenomenon of politics of 
streams?  
The fact of political pragmatism and the change of Muslims’ 
paradigm can not one hundred percent be used to characterize and 
identify the recent Muslims’ political behaviors. It is considerably true 
that there are enormous social and political changes influencing 
Muslims’ political awareness. It is also correct that political 
pragmatism has become a soul of Indonesian politics. But it must be 
acknowledged those can not make the political symbol and political 
identity based on the political stream understanding totally disappear. 
Since it is undoubted that politics is frequently defined as the 
worldview frequently projected or represented into the choices of 
symbol, identity, and communalism.  
21Wanandi, Jusuf, “Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and 
Future Challenges.”Asia-Pacific Review, (Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002), p. 104-112.  
22Baswedan, 2004, Op.Cit, p.689 
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C. Conclusion 
For instance, the community of abangan would be persistently 
reluctant to join with orthodox Islam political base such as PKS. Their 
political preferences would be dropped to the secular or nationalist 
political parties such as PDIP, Golkar, or PDIP. PKS as the right wing 
of Islam would be problematic to set up a permanent political 
coalition with PDIP as the pole of left wing of secularist-nationalist. 
Meanwhile Nahdlatul Ulama’s political cadres (traditionalist-
inclusive) would be also consistently reluctant to collectively set up a 
permanent coalition with Muhammadiyah’s political mainstream 
(modernist-conservative) because of the institutional sentiment, even 
less with PKS’s cadres (radical revivalist) which basically have many 
differences in the religious paradigm and interpretations of political 
Islam either pro-Islamist or inclusive-pluralist.  
That political behavior seems to be inevitable in the 
Indonesian political landscape. Thus, even though stream politics 
would be not significant determinant factor influencing electors’ 
political preferences, it would be still reasonable to justify that 
Geertz’s political stream framework is actually still relevant to be 
“one of the analytical instruments” to understanding the political 
constellation right now. But, of course, it needs other more 
contemporarily analytical instruments to capture meaningful politics 
and the current political configuration comprehensively and 
objectively. On the other words, Indonesian politics can not escape yet 
the long shadow of Geertz's persuasive theory and incredible 
ethnography haunting the contemporary political facts. *** 
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